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Atomism, Identity Criteria, and Impossibility Logic 
John B. Davis 
Marquette University, Milwaukee 
It is arguable that there is nothing more 
fundamental to the Neoclassical view of 
economic rationality than methodological or 
atomistic individualism. The idea that individuals 
are fully autonomous beings in the sense of 
possessing independent choice sets seems to 
necessarily underlie the notion of economic 
rationality in that the idea of determinate, rational 
choice essentially depends on the notion that an 
individual can restrict him or herself to own 
private concerns and objectives in a socially non-
interactive manner. Thus, that rational choice is 
central to the entire scarcity logic of optimization 
and efficiency means that this logic also depends 
upon the assumption of atomistic individualism. 
Of course, it is by no means obvious that 
individual choice sets are or should be regarded 
as autonomous and independent (see e.g., 
Lesnoff, 1974, pp.75-108), and much heterodox 
economic theory takes this as a fundamental 
point of divergence from Neoclassicism. Yet in 
their desire to address the topics of efficiency 
and optimal economic policy, mainstream 
economists neglect these issues, too often. 
perhaps, coming as a result to regard the 
atomistic character of the economic agent as 
necessary and indisputable. 
Critics of Neoclassicism have often argued 
that empirical evidence and experimental .studies 
strongly suggest that individuals do not behave 
as atomistic, rational optimizers (e.g., Kahneman 
et aI, 1986). In this short paper, it is further 
argued that atomistic individualism possesses 
certain fundamental logical problems, the 
existence of which would lend support to the 
empirical evidence and experimental results of 
Neoclassicism's critics. In essence, the argument 
here questions whether it can reasonably be said 
that individual preference orderings are indeed 
truly autonomous, and thus properly primitive in 
Neoclassical economic analysis. Alternatively, is 
this key doctrine of neoclassicism - termed by 
Boulding the "Immaculate Conception of the 
Indifference Curve" (1969, p. 2) - truly a 
reasonable one, or might it not rather be the case, 
as argued by most heterodox economists and 
probably the great majority of social scientists, 
that individual preferences are in significant 
degree socially influenced? 
I propose to argue that this is the case by 
reproducing Marx's stance towards Hegel in here 
turning Arrow on his head by arguing that the -
I believe - right-side-up view of the world is one 
in which individual preferences are socially 
influellced in significant degree. Arrow (1963 
[1951)) presented an impossibility theorem to 
demonstrate that were one to take individual 
preferences (plausibly characterized) as given, 
then one could not aggregate those preferences 
to produce a social choice function. On the line 
of thinking in this paper, it is asserted that were 
one to take social preferences as given, then one 
cannot go on to disaggregate social preferences 
to produce autonomous choice functions. On this 
view, it is social preference orderings which need 
to be taken as conceptually primitive, rather than 
individual preference orderings, and. in effect. 
something on the order of a converse 
impossibility theorem or logic implies that it is 
autonomous choice rather than social choice, that 
is without justification. 
More is involved in this reversal of 
reasoning, however, than simply adopting 
another starting point. The issue here is not 
simply whether truly autonomous preferences 
cannot be inferred from social preferences, but 
whether the very idea of autonomous preferences 
is itself ultimately flawed. Accordingly, in order 
to flesh out the outlines of a converse 
impossibility logic, and at the same time to argue 
that it is the only acceptable impossibility logic 
available to us, I will argue that preferences are 
necessarily social in a particularly important 
sense. I will argue this, first, by assuming that 
preferences are autonomous, and by then 
showing that this results in something of a 
contradiction. Briefly, though autonomous 
preferences presuppose the distinct individual 
identities of those economic agents to whom they 
belong, the assumption of autonomous 
preferences, it can be shown, makes it impossible 
to persuasively distinguish or individuate distinct 
economic agents. Second, I will then argue that, 
given a plausible characterization of social 
preferences, .a converse impossibility logic can · 
be set forth which concludes that not only is it 
not possible to infer autonomous preferences 
from social preferences, but also that, given the 
questionable nature of the former. only the latter 
can be thought coherent. Preferences, then, must 
in an important sense be social, and indeed that 
this is so is essential to any meaningful 
characterization of economic agents as distinct, 
identifiable individuals. 
Autonomous Preferences and Individual 
Identity Criteria 
A necessary criterion for the individuation 
of an agent of any kind is that one be able to 
trace or track that selfsame individual through 
changes that might conceivably terminate or 
somehow otherwise bring into question that 
individual's distinct existence (parfit, 1984. pp. 
20 I ff) . In regard to the Neoclassical economic 
agent, this means that,.in order to be able to say 
with confidence that one has successfully 
distinguished a distinct individual, one must be 
able to say that through a process of change that 
indi vidual's preferences remain the preferences 
of that individual alone. or that that individual's 
preferences have not been learned, adopted, or 
socially inculcated. That is to say, it cannot be 
the case on the Neoclassical view that the 
preferences of individuals are interdependent in 
important ways, so that these individuals are 
themselves non-independent in taste and 
therefore choice. 
Neoclassical authors, of course, allow for 
consumption externalities where one individual's 
tastes influence another's. However, the logic of 
this analysis also indicates (as does the very term 
itself) that externalities are adjustments in 
indi vidual taste that, at the margin so to speak, 
leave unaffected the essential integrity of the 
individual's autonomous structure of taste. That 
is. the general presumption is that the great bulk 
of the arguments across different individuals' 
utility functions are non-interactive, so that the 
nominal independence of individuals' different 
utility functions effectively captures the supposed 
actual independence of the great majority of their 
respective arguments (for a standard treatment, 
see Henderson and Quandt, 1980. pp. 296-8). 
This makes the theory of external effects in 
consumption essentially an ad hoc 
accompaniment to the basic analysis of consumer 
taste that most theorists thus feel entitled to 
ignore (though see Leibenstein , 1950). 
Consequently, the theory of individual 
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identity that underlies the neoclassical view of 
the atomistic economic agent is that indi"iduals 
are distinguished and re-identifiable through 
change by the continuity of each individual's 
characteristically private tastes and preferences. 
Such a theory goes back to Hume's skeptical 
view (1978) that the self can be thought no more 
than a bundle of preferences. Thus, on the view 
that taste is exogenous, individuals cannot have 
or come to have each other's preferences, so that 
whatever preferences the individual has over time 
must de facto be th9se of that individual alone. 
Note. however. that this argument - effectively 
an argument by default - does not establish a 
continuity of individual preference. Though it 
asserts that an individual can never have 
another's preferences, it does not show how the 
preferences an individual happens to have are 
specifically those of that same individual. 
To make this further step, it would be 
necessary to somehow show that an individual's 
preferences over time possessed a continuity in 
structure that could only be associated with that 
particular individual alone. Individual identity 
would then be a matter of a singular continuity 
in an integrated set 9f preferences. However, that 
an individual's preferences are regarded as 
private in Neoclassical theory means that their 
structure must essentially be opaque to external 
observers, since were it possible to say how an 
individual's tastes were structured, then it would 
also be possible to meaningfully compare 
different individuals' taste or preference 
structures. This in turn would undermine the idea 
that tastes or preferences were fundamentally 
private, indeed even perhaps suggest that 
different individuals shared patterns of taste or 
preference. Thus, unless one were prepared to 
assume on principle that each individual's 
structure of taste was necessarily distinct from 
every other individual's, one could never rule out 
the possibility that similarities in taste implied 
the existence of shared tastes. Of course. to 
assume that individual structures of taste are 
necessarily distinct, is merely to assume that 
individuals are themselves distinct. that is. to 
assume the desired conclusion that individuals 
possess distinct identities. 
Neoclassical theory, it thus seems, is 
actually undermined by its characterization of the 
individuality of economic agents in that its 
reliance on the privacy of tastes does more to 
cut-off an elaboration of effective identity criteria 
than to support such an enterprise. More strongly, 
Neoclassical theory might even be thought self-
contradictory on this score , in that the very 
means by which it construes agent individuality 
in terms of autonomous preferences seem to be 
incompatible with establishing any reasonable 
criteria for explaining agent individuality. This 
, all suggests that treating autonomous preferences 
, as primitive in a theory of economic behavior is 
fundamentally mistaken. In line with the 
suggestion above, then, I recommend that 
preferences be thought necessarily social (in a 
sense yet to be explained), and that the idea that 
preference are somehow social be taken as 
primitive in economic theory. From this vantage 
point, it would then be argued, contra Arrow, , 
that there exists a converse impossibility logic, , 
whereby it can be demonstrated that purely 
autonomous preferences cannot be inferred from 
our conceptually primitive social preferences. 
A Converse Impossibility Logic 
To begin, it is fair to say that were one able 
to claim a personal continuity of taste and 
preference (such as would be sufficient to 
establish one ' s personal identity through a 
process of change), then one would know how 
to make use of language and the rules that govern 
it in such a way that one could consistently refer 
to one ' s present tastes and preferences in ' 
essentially the same way that one referred to 
one's past tastes and preferences. To do this, 
moreover, one would presumably need to be able 
to say that the reason one was able to use a single 
term or expression to similarly describe 
experiences on two different occasions was that 
there was some single fact or set of facts about 
each of these experiences that justified describing 
them each in the same way . From this 
perspective, a continuity of taste and preference, 
and the personal identity it would justify, derives 
from two things: first, that it is factually the case 
that one's different experiences of having certain 
tastes and preferences have something in 
common, and, second, that individuals are able 
to recognize and say what this common character 
is. 
Wittgenstein, however, in his influential 
Philosophical Investigations (1958) argued that, 
despite the apparent plausibility of this view, it 
is difficult to say that individuals use language 
in the manner suggested. In particular, when one 
considers an individual's intentions in using a 
particular term or expression on a given occasion, 
it never seems possible to agree there exists any 
unique fact or set of facts about that individual's 
intention on that occasion that correlates 
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precisely with a similar fact or set of facts 
regarding that individual's intention in using that 
same language on later occasions. Why should 
this be the case? One answer to this question is 
that it is simply impossible to establish facts of 
this particular sort. For something to be accepted 
as a fact, its subject mailer must generally be 
subject to public scrutiny and examination. But 
an individual's actual experience of having a 
given taste or preference is private and 
unobservable. Therefore, an indi vidual would 
never be able to establish to the satisfaction of 
others that his or her private experiences were, 
as a mattcr of fact, properly referred to by using 
certain terms or expressions. As Wittgenstein 
scholars have come to understand this, there can 
be no such thing as a truly private language, 
meaning one where an individual privately 
applies labels or terms to his or her inner, mental 
experiences, and so creates a language only he 
or she can verify is being properly used. Rather, 
language is. by its very nature, an intersubjective, 
public affair, and as such precludes there being 
any facts describing its use in connection with 
matters that are characteristically private. 
From this perspective. the Neoclassical view' 
of the individual becomes highly questionable. 
That view makes the identity of the autonomous 
individual depend upon a continuity in private 
tastes and preferences. Yet the understanding of 
language in Willgenstein's Philosophical 
Investigations leaves us with the conclusion that 
there simply are no facts that deri ve from an 
individual ' s private characterization of his or her 
mental experiences. Alternatively, to the extent 
that. we can describe an individual's private 
mental experiences. it must necessarily be the 
case that we do so in an intersubjective language 
that necessarily accords a public or social 
dimension to individuals' characterizations of 
those experiences. Neoclassicism, then. either 
cannot constitute individual identity on the terms 
it supposes - the autonomous nature of taste and 
preference - or, to have some theory of 
individuality it must treat preferences and tastes 
as being socially determined in some significant 
sense. Here. that sense ' in which tastes and 
preferences must be socially determined is 
connected to the intersubjective nature of 
language. In effect. the very meanings of the 
terms and expressions we employ to describe our 
mental life are socially learned. Thus, though our 
own experiences always remain our own, their 
significance and meaning for us is inescapably 
dependent upon their social interpretation. 
A further argument for this conclusion 
comes from a stronger interpretation of 
Wittgenstein's claim. Following Kripke's (1982) 
interpretation of Wiltgen stein, Wittgenstein' s 
argument regarding the problem of finding facts 
that justify the use of same language on different 
occasions applies no less to public objects than 
to our private, mental experiences. On this view, 
to think that it is" the re-OCCurrence of certain 
facts that tells us when language terms and 
expressions are properly employed is to 
mistakenly suppose that the operation of 
language can be modeled on the principle of 
induction. Yet the most important and remarkable 
thing we can say about language is that it is a 
paradigmatic ally creative practice in that 
language users possess the ability to successfully 
use terms previously employed in entirely new 
and novel contexts. The induction model of 
language misses this altogether, and thus misses 
something very important about the nature of 
language. Specifically, language is an essentially 
conventional affair, meaning that its successful 
use entails a commitment on the part of each 
individual language-user to a language 
community's continually on-going determination 
of meaning. Quite simply, because the context 
of each expression is always unique, its 
meaningfulness requires first and foremost an 
intention to communicate. This implies that the 
relationship between meaning and intention is 
normative in the sense that language users seek 
the meanings that ought to enable their 
communication with others. The relationship 
between meaning and intention is not, as the 
induction model has it, a descriptive one that 
abstractly pairs meanings and facts. 
Contrary to Neoclassicism, then, tastes and 
preferences are necessarily social. On the fust 
interpretation of Wittgenstein' s thinking, 
preferences and tastes are socially determined in 
that the language we employ to account for our 
private mental experiences is socially developed 
and acquired. On the second interpretation, 
preferences and tastes possess a social dimension 
in that any and every " use of language 
presupposes a commitment to communication 
that requires we treat individuals as first and 
foremost social beings. Thus, our understanding 
of both the learning of language and the very 
practice of communication tell us that individual 
tastes and preferences are fundamentally social, 
contrary to the customary view in Neoclassicism 
that tastes and preferences are autonomous. 
Further, since this can be taken as a requirement 
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that social tastes and preferences be thought 
primitive, that these arguments imply we cannot 
produce a conception of preferences as 
autonomous on the order imagined in 
Neoclassicism tells us that a converse 
impossibility logic can fairly be sai(i to apply. 
Concluding Comment 
None of this, it should be emphasized, 
implies that individuals, individual meanings, 
individual tastes, or individual choices cannot be 
distinguished. In fact, an analysis of preference 
and taste as possessing a social dimension lays 
important foundations for an adequate theory of 
individual identity, since the idea that each 
context of language use is somehow unique 
implies that individuals may well be 
distinguished by their own unique histories of 
language use. While meanings themselves always 
possess an important element of social 
determination within a community of language~ 
users, that at the same time each occasion of 
language use on the part of an individual 
necessarily involves a unique employment of the 
common body of meaning suggests that 
individuals are distinguished by the particular 
sequential patterns of meaning use they each 
initiate. Here, I do not attempt to investigate the 
complex matter of how this historical 
distinctiveness of expression would make it 
possible to set out the basis on which one might 
identify and re-identify individuals through a 
process of change, since the primary objective 
of the discussion of a converse impossibility 
theorem here was to attempt to reverse traditional 
Neoclassical reasoning on the subject. However, 
in line with arguments I have previously made 
concerning the referentiality of language (Davis, 
1989), I would suggest, following authors such 
as Putnam (1973), that just as terms come to be 
"baptized" at certain points in time, and then 
retain their initial designations in language 
communities of heterogeneous language-users by 
a sort of historical "referential chain," so also 
individuals might properly be thought distinct 
and re-identifiable beings in virtue of the 
continual 're-baptizing' they effect upon 
themselves in their personal histories of language 
use. 
Finally, whether or not the particular case 
developed here for a converse impossibility 
reasoning is persuasive, it seems fair to say thai 
the one general issue whi<;h deserves furtbe. 
attention in economics is the issue of agenl 
identity. Ironically, most economists - no doubl 
in part on account of comparative static character 
of neoclassical economic reasoning - do not even 
recognize, nor much less understand, the nature 
and importance of the issue. Yet it is elementary 
that just as the concept of equilibrium needs to 
be examined in regard to existence, uniqueness, 
and stability, similar formal matters pertain to 
use of agent concepts. A fair amount of recent 
work on the theory of the firm reflects a 
sensitivity to questions of this sort. Indeed the 
original fundamental question in the theory of 
the firm is why firms exist at all, or in the 
language here, what is it that explains their 
identity as individual agents through time? Less 
awareness of this sort resides on the all-important 
demand side of the economy. This short paper 
is hoped to contribute to better thinking on the 
subject. 
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